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LOMA LINDA UNIVERSITY 
ElHICS CENTER 
GERALD WINSLOW JOINSLLU FACUL TV 
A RIGHTEOUS REMNANT 
ADVENTIST THEMES FOR 
PERSONAL AND SOCIAL ETHICS 
October 24, 1987 
FOREWORD 
Harvey Cox 
Harvard Divinity School 
November 20, 1987 
REMNANT 
Charles T eel, Jr. 
Lorna Linda University 
December 4,1987 
CREATION 
Jack Provonsha 
Lorna Linda University 
January 8, 1985 
COVENANT 
Michael Pearson 
Newbold College 
February 12, 1988 
SANCTUARY 
David Larson 
Lorna Linda University 
March 11, 1988 
SABBATH 
Miroslav Kis 
Andrews University 
April ~, 1988 
LAW 
James Wafters 
Lorna Linda University 
AprilS, 1988 
SALVATION 
Charles Scriven 
Sl1go Seventh-day AdvenUst Church 
April 29, 1988 
WHOLENESS 
Ginger Harwood 
Iliff School of Theology 
May 13. 1988 
MILLENNIUM 
Gerald Winslow 
Lorna Linda University 
June 3.1988 
ADVENT 
Roy Branson 
Kennedy tnstitute of Ethics 
June 4,1988 
AFTERWORD 
Martin Marty 
University of Chicago 
Gerald R.Winslow, until recently a 
professor of religion at Walla Walla 
College and . author of the critically 
acclaimed Triage and Justice: The 
Ethics of Rationing Life-Saving Medi-
cal Resources (University of California 
Press, 1982) as well as numerous 
scholarly articles, joined LLU's Depart-
ment of Christian Ethics effective Sep-
tember 1, 1987. At Loma Linda, 
Winslow will teach students preparing 
to enter one of the health professions 
as well as undergraduate and 
graduate students. He will also partici-
pate in the activities of the Center for 
Christian Bioethics. 
Educated at Walla Walla College 
(B.A., 1967), Andrews University 
(M.A., 1968) and Berkeley's Graduate 
Theological Union (Ph.D., 1979), 
Winslow began his career as a chap-
lain at Portland Adventist Hospital and 
then served as Associate Dean of 
Men at Walla Walla College. He sub-
sequently taught ethics and religion 
for seventeen years in Walla Walla's 
school of theology, moving from in-
structor to professor. He has also 
served as an adjunct professor at San 
Francisco Theological Seminary, New-
bold College, and Andrews University. 
He received the Distinguished 
Teacher Award at Walla Walla Col-
lege in 1974. 
Winslow has received fellowships 
from the National Endowment for the 
Humanities, the Danforth Foundation, 
and the Burlington-Northern Founda-
tion. He has done post-doctoral study 
at Cambridge, Virginia and Tubingen 
Universities. In recent months, he has 
lectured at the Universities of Texas, 
Utah, and Florida as well as at Law-
rence, Washington State and Gon-
zaga, He has also recently lectured at 
numerous medical centers and hospi-
tal associations throughout the nation. 
Winslow's publications focus upon 
ethical issues in allocating scarce 
medical resources. His writings also 
explore topics as diverse as abortion, 
the role of Scripture in making ethical 
decisions and divorce. He is the au-
thor of the articles on "triage" and 
"vegetarianism" in Westminster Press' 
Dictionary of Christian Ethics. He 
serves on the editorial board of Sec-
ond Opinion: Health, Faith and Ethics , 
the journal of the Park Ridge Center 
near Chicago. 
Thompson Library 
Opens September 25 
Carolyn and Ralph Thompson, Jr., 
of Redlands, California were the hon-
ored guests at a September 25 recep-
tion that ' celebrated the opening of a 
library named for their generosity. The 
ribbon-cutting ceremony and meal 
were held in the refurbished rooms of 
Griggs Hall that will house the first 
5,000 volumes of what will become 
one of the nation's finest bioethics col-
lections. 
LLU president Norman J. Woods 
thanked the Thompsons for their early 
and continuing support. He also pre-
sented them with a copper plaque that 
expresses gratitude to the Thompsons 
"for their VISion, friendship and 
generosity in assisting the Center and 
establishing its library." Jack Pro-
vonsha, chairman of the Center's 
Board of Directors, hung a duplicate 
plaque on the new library's door. 
Materials located in the Thompson 
Library will be referenced in the uni-
versity's Del Webb Library. Its staff 
will acquire and catalogue the mater-
'ials the Center finances and houses, 
thanks to a. cooperative agreement 
proposed by Maynard Lowry, director 
of LLU's libraries at Loma Linda and 
Riverside. 
Carolyn Thompson, a nurse, is the 
president of a real estate development . 
company in San Bernardino. She has 
been an enthusiastic and effective 
member of the Board of Directors 
since its inception. Ralph Thomson, 
Jr. is a surgeon at LLU's medical cen-
ter and a professor in its medical 
school. The Thompsons are avid 
travelers and bibliophiles. 
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Anencephalic Infants as Organ Donors: 
. Ethical Issues · . 
On October 16, a transplantation team at Loma Unda led by surgeons Leonard Bailey and John Jacobsen transplanted a heart from a brain dead 
anencephalic infant into Baby Paul who had been delivered by Caesarean section by obstetrician E1mar Sakala only three hours earlier. This transplan-
tation was innovative medically. It was also interesting ethically because it prompted further discussions regarding the moral wisdom of using brain 
dead or non~brain dead anencephalic human neonates as organ donors. The following exchange between Jacquelyn Bamman, a neonatologist from 
Ventura, California and O. Ward Swarner, a neonatologist who is the chairman of the Ethics Committee at Loma Unda University Medical Center, high-
lights the issues that exist in today's legal context. The essay by James Walters, an ethicist at LLU who has been active in these debates for two years, 
explores the ethical advantages and disadvantages of reversing current statutes so that anencephalic infants may be used as organ donors before 
"whole brain" death is verified. 
A Neonatologist's Concern 
Gentlemen: 
I am very troubled by the recent surgery performed in your 
institution where a heart from an anencephalic infant was 
used in a transplant operation for a newborn with hypoplastic 
left-heart syndrome. As a neonatologist, I understand very 
well the desire to find some meaning in the existence of an 
infant with anencephaly by donating a needed organ to 
another infant who might thereby have a normal or near-nor-
mal life, but there are serious and controversial ethical and 
legal issues. 
The ethical issues raised in my mind relate to (1) subjecting 
the anencephalic child to assisted ventilation, any other sup-
portive measures needed to maintain optimal donor status, 
and finally surgery, all clearly with no intent to benefit that 
child; (2) directly causing the death of the anencephalic child 
by surgically removing the heart; (3) the lack of any rational 
way to prevent extension of this same approach to involve 
other children with serious defects. 
I realize there are arguments to support what was done. If 
the child with anencephaly does not feel pain (I personally 
don't know how much might be felt at the brain stem level), 
then I.V.'s, intubation, suctioning, surgery, etc. might be ac-
ceptable if great benefit is obtained. I am not sure, however, 
that we have the right to inflict invasive procedures on one in-
dividual, no matter how defective, strictly to provide benefit for 
another individual. 
I believe it is appropriate to withhold medical life-prolonging 
support for infants with anencephaly because of their known 
short life span, but I think that is a very different matter from 
performing an act which of necessity results in the child's 
death. I realize the issue of active versus passive euthanasia 
also has legitimate arguments which can be made on both 
sides. 
I am very concerned, if this is considered to be a reasona-
ble approach, about extension to other situations. If use as a 
donor can be justified by the fact (that there is only a limited 
life span;· will we extend this approach to infants who will 
soon die with other problems such as Tay-Sachs, Werdnig-
Hoffman disease, etc.? In some of these situations, you could 
even argue that, unlike the anencephalic, there is benefit to 
the donors because you are sparing them pain. If use as a 
donor can be justified by the fact that the brain is severely ab-
normal, then will we extend this approach to the infants with 
hydranencephaly, grade IV intracranial hemorrhage, Trisomy 
13 and 18, etc.? 
Finally, the anencephalic child does not meet the usual 
criteria for a donor because that child is not legally brain 
dead. As we are all well aware, the legal definition of brain 
death includes absence of brain stem as well as cortical func-
tion. 
I hope the ethical and legal issues involved were discussed 
at length with both sets of parents. I realize there will be 
widely divergent opinions on this issue, and that compassion-
ate, honest and ethical analysis by different individuals will re-
sult in opposite views, but I think it all the more important for 
that reason that everyone involved be well informed. 
Jacquelyn Bamman, M.D. 
A Neonatologist's Reply ( 
Dear Dr. Bamman: 
As the chairman of the Ethics Committee at Lorna Linda 
University Medical Center, it is my pleasure to respond to 
your thoughtfully written letter. You express concerns that 
have occurred to us and I'm sure to many others wrestling 
with these catastrophic problems. 
I will address these issues in the order that you express 
them as they pertain to this case. 
1. The use of assisted ventilation and supportive treatment 
is controversial in any critically ill child. The potential for bene-
fit vs. harm is constantly on the mind of any neonatologist 
caring for infants and children on ventilators. The major 
reason that we used one is to keep the tissues well oxyge-
nated and thereby to successfully accomplish the donation 
wish of the parents. Pain and suffering didn't loom as a major 
issue because the patient was already pronounced brain 
dead. 
2. The point at which this particular child died was long be-
fore the organ removal. She therefore experienced no pain or 
discomfort during the preparation for the transplant. As is our 
policy, the child was re-examined at Lorna Linda by child 
neurologists and again determined to be brain dead before 
any transplant could be considered. She was determined to 
be legally dead by both local authorities and our criteria in-
cluding no respiratory effort and CO2 > 60 mn. 
3. You raised a third issue: ''the lack of any rational way to 
prevent extension of this same approach to involve other chil-, 
dren with serious defects." I hope you are satisfied that by ob 
serving our protocol of using only children who are brain dead 
we have a rational way to protect the patients whose fragile 
lives are in our hands. We care greatly, as I'm sure you do, 
for children with serious birth defects. There are no intentions 
or justifications for putting some in jeopardy to harvest organs 
for others. There is no intention to treat any child, no matter 
how ill or compromised by birth defects, in ways other than 
)
those which qualify legally and ethically according to the 80-
ailed Baby Doe Guidelines. 
Finally I wish to address the broader issue which you ad-
dress: the possible use of non-brain dead infants with poor 
prognosis as transplant donors. Our Ethics Committee in con-
sultation with other concerned staff members, nurses, social 
workers, ministers, and ethicists has met on numerous occa-
sions to discuss this and related issues. We will continue to 
follow with interest the publications from the Hastings Center, 
Dr. Callahan, Dr. Kathleen Nolan and others. We are also 
aware of proposals by some to change the law to make 
anencephaly an exception to the brain death provision. 
At this time we choose to reiterate our position as positive, 
caring advocates for all children with birth defects. We remain 
committed to doing all that we can in preventing and alleviat-
ing these disorders. But the Ethics Committee has not ap-
proved any harve~ting of organs . or procurement of trans-
plants in any other than brain dead patients. 
We respect the life of these patients no matter how clouded 
the prognosis. 
O. Ward Swarner, M.D. 
Should. the Law 
Be Changed? 
by James Walters 
Recent breakthroughs in cardiac surgical . technique for 
newborns have only exacerbated an existing problem: the lim-
ited pool of transplantable neonatal hearts. An estimated 
7,500 infants with life-threatening congenital heart defects are 
annually born in this country. Of these, 650 newborns are 
afflicted by hypoplastic left-heart syndrome, a universally fatal 
condition until late successes in infant heart surgery and par-
ticularly in neonatal heart transplantation. Many of these · in-
fants will die simply because of a limited cardiac donor pool. 
In October of this year the first transplantation of an 
anencephalic heart was performed at Loma Linda, heating up 
a simmering debate on utilizing the anencephalic population 
as organ donors. The discussion has two levels: first, the 
question of morally appropriate care for anencephalics prior to 
their death at which time their donor status is clear, and sec-
ond, the question of whether state laws regarding determina-
tion of death should be changed to allow direct procurement 
of anencephalic organs. 
The intent of this essay is to critically marshal the pro's and 
con's of the second question, the appropriateness of making 
anencephalics a legal exception to the Uniform Determination 
of Death Act, a "whole brain" death standard. 
The Nature of Anencephaly 
Anencephalic newborns are "born dying," as Paul Ramsey 
puts it. In a study of over two million infants born in California 
during a recent five-year period, 888 were anencephalic. Fifty-
,eight percent were born alive. Of these, approximately 65 per-
I ent died within 24 hours. An additional 30 percent died with-
in the first week, while only two lived for approximately three 
months!1 . 
Anencephalics represent the nadir of handicapped infants. 
Both cerebral hemispheres are missing, and there is little, if 
any, brain function above the stem. The infants are grotes-
que: foreheads are absent, a mass of undeveloped brain tis-
sue covered by membrane caps their upturned, shortened 
heads, the eyeballs bulge from defective sockets, and the 
ears sometimes touch the shoulders. 
The incidence of anencephaly is 1 per 2,000 births on aver-
age in this country, although significant variations are likely 
throughout various regions. Between two and three thousand 
anencephalics are born annually, with the birth rate expected 
to drop as the antenatal alpha fetoprotein screening program 
for detecting neural tube defects is more widely adopted. 
Are anencephalic newborns an acceptable source for neo-
natal transplantable hearts and other organs? From the medi-
cal pOint of view, the evidence is not all in. Specialists as-
sumethat an anencephalic infant's organs are healthy and 
appropriate for transplantions. But because there has been lit-
tle demand for these babies' organs, little data exists on their 
suitability. Medical science doesn't even understand the 
cause of their early deaths, although respiratory failure is sus-
pected. 
Legal and Ethical Issues 
The present legal status of anencephalic babies is 
straightforward. All human infants born alive are registered as 
citizens and receive Constitutional protection for their lives. 
The willful taking of an anencepahlic baby's life would lay one 
open to possible homicide charges, regardless of intent. 
Anencephalic babies have no "higher" brain, but their brain 
stem functions are intact, and hence they possess spontane-
ous respiration and circulation. They have good reflexes and 
are not dissimilar to well babies in many primitive respects. 
Ethically, the issue is anything but straightforward and bris-
tles with questions: Would society's good be served by 
anencephalic organ transplantation? Is such transplantation 
right? Assuming that the transplantation is medically sound, 
would it be defensible civil disobedience openly to break the 
law to save the life of an infant dying for want of an available 
anencephalic organ? 
These issues are valid, but my focus is more narrow: Is it 
ethically appropriate to make anencephalics an exception to 
normal brain death criteria? 
California Senator Milton Marks introduced Senate Bill 2018 
in February of 1986 which called for amending the state's 
Uniform Determination of Death Act (UDDA) to include a 
clause stating that "an individual born with the condition of 
anencephaly is dead." Marks later modified the bill, proposing 
that a state health advisory board examine the issue of se-
verely handicapped newborns and make recommendations 
regarding their treatment, the feasibility of infant organ trans-
plants, and the acceptability of anencephalics as donors with 
attention to the UDDA and possible "necessary changes.,,2 
The idea of declaring anencephalics "dead" is perhaps ' ludicr-
ous, but the larger issue of whether UDOA statutes should be 
amended to allow for anencephalic organ procurement is im-
portant. 
The Case Against Direct Anencephalic Organ 
Procurement 
An ethically substantive case exists for both sides of the 
debate. First, J will develop three arguments against making 
anencephalic infants an exception to current laws on brain 
death. 
1. Definition of death. Anencepahlic infants are not dead 
according to current criteria. Although anencephalic infants 3 
are without higher brain functions, their brain stem allows for 
much typical newborn activity. Most importantly, circulatory 
and respiratory functions are performed naturally. Crying, 
4 
swallowing, and regurgitation occur. Infants with incomplete 
anencephaly may have the mobility of a 4 month fetus. All in-
fants respond to vestibular stimuli, and some to sound. Re-
flexes are usually strong, particularly their response to painful 
stimuli. The grasp reflex is easily initiated.3 
2. Slippery slope. Declaring anencephalics to be function-
ally dead may initiate a slide down the "slippery slope." Paul 
Ramsey advances this type of argument in regard to abortion, 
and his principle applies analogically here: "Since we should 
treat similar cases similarly, if x degree of defect would justify 
abortion, the same x degrees of defect would with equal co-
gency justify infanticide.,,4 If anencepahlics are seen to have 
marginal human life which today can be sacrificed for the 
good of society, what other forms of human life might be uti-
lized tomorrow for the supposed good of all? If anencephalics 
are an e-xception, by what logic do we limit the exception to 
this anomaly? Why not extend such reasoning to other hand-
icapped infants, to those thought to have a future of suffering 
which is even worse than death? And finally, why limit such 
treatment to neonates? 
3. Priority of law. Because the defining of death is such 
an important issue, a clear and enforceable regulation is man-
datory. This is true for two reasons: 
First, individual patients need to be protected against any 
premature decisions on their deaths. Hans Jonas, in the early 
debates over organ transplants, argued for the "primary invio-
lability" of the individual patient, and for "the mandatory re-
spect for invasion-proof selfhood." On the issue of defining 
death he contended: "Since we do not know the borderline 
between life and death, nothing less than the maximum defi-
nition of death will do - brain death plus heart death plus any 
other indication that may be pertinent - before final violence 
is allowed to be done."s 
Second, society is best served by a public policy which un-
ambiguously states its settled convictions on important mat-
ters. After much study and consultation with medical au-
thorities, philosophers, theologians and others, the President's 
Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine 
and Biomedical and Behavioral Research settled on a "con-
servative" definition of brain death. The Commission con-
sciously rejected a neocortical definition and chose a "whole 
"Is it ethically appropriate to make anence-
phalies an exception to normal brain death 
criteria?" 
brain" standard because the latter merely clarified "the under-
standing of death that enjoys near lIniversal acceptance in 
our society." The Commission further explained; "On a matter 
so fundamental to a society's sense of itself - touching 
deeply held personal and religious beliefs - and so final for 
the individuals involved, one should desire much greater con-
sensus than now exists before taking the major step of radi-
cally revising the concept of death.,,6 
Good law embodies and carefully articulates society's 
deepest sense of right behavior.: Further, good law defines 
basic functional boundaries which give life its public meaning 
and within which life can flourish. We now appropriately reject 
many of the taboos of primitive communities as superstitious, 
but·.such taboos promoted vital social integration. Today, a 
reasonably derived consensus on regulations concerning life 
and death is essential to us if the social fabric of the land is 
to remain strong. 
Admittedly, the giving of priority to social integration limits 
individual autonomy. But the well-being of society rightly does 
take precedence over strictly individual hardship cases. Law 
written from the basis of hard cases makes for poor law. Ethi-
cal action, in certain difficult cases, may demand the courage 
to engage in public civil disobedience, but for compelling so-
cial reasons, the law may be proper. For example, laws ~ 
against aiding and abetting suicide protect society's high valu· 
ation of human life. Nevertheless, it is correctly argued that -
such laws may place an undue burden upon terminally ill per-
sons who unbearably suffer and. desire aid in ending their · 
lives. The rights and needs of autonomous · individuals are fi-
nally bounded by and to be perceived in light of the collective 
good. 
The Case For Direct Anencephalic Organ Procurement 
Although the above arguments are powerful, four strong ar-
guments can be made in favor of making anencephaly an ex-
ception to our current definition of death. 
1. Best interests. The best interests of anencephalic new-
borns are not served by sustaining them until their natural 
deaths. In fact, given the condition of anencephalics, whether 
the concept of "best interests" applies is questionable. Society 
may see its own interests served by providing basic care for 
anencephalic babies, but this should not be confused with the 
anencephalics' best interests. Regardless, the President's 
Commission views the best interests test as the primary stan-
dard for deciding treatment or non-treatment for highly com-
promised neonates, and anencephalics do not meet the 
criteria of this standard. 
2. ConSistency. Terminally and seriously ill adults have 
recently won court cases which sustain their right to forego 
life-sustaining treatment. Such a right is much less sure for 
similarly situated neonates. An important document was is-
sued last year by the Los Angeles County Medical Associa-
tion and the Los Angeles County Bar Association. Based on 
recent California Second District Court of Appeals decisionE 
on the Barber and Bartling cases, the document stated that "It 
is the right of every adult person . .. to make his or her own 
decision regarding medical care ... even when such a deci-
sion might result in shortening the individual's life." It also 
stated that the same right to forego medical treatment be-
longs to the incompetent adult patient through an appropriate 
surrogate. 
Ironically, the Department of Health and Human Services' 
Baby Doe regulations point in the opposite direction. It stipu-
lates that even babies whose conditions indicate the withhold-
ing of exotic medical treatment, must still receive "appropriate 
nutrition, hydration, and medication." Just as some courts now 
allow gravely ill adults to forego all treatment, for the sake of 
consistency we must extend this humane provision to se-
verely handicapped neonates through their surrogates. 
Because anencephalic infants are devoid of the potential 
for any uniquely human brain functions, state law should de-
clare that usual brain death criteria are irrelevant in these 
cases. Parents should have the option of donating the organs 
of their anencephalic infants at any time. 
3. Life-saving. It would be wrong, obviously, to use 
anencephalic organs for transplantation if the organs serve 
their host's best interests. But they don't, and the organs 
could be used to save other infants' lives. Although the inter-
ests of the primary patient are most important, when those in-
terests are no longer served or never existed, the ulterior use 
of the host's organs assumes major importance. Many babies 
with severe congenital heart defects will die unless a source 
of suitable hearts is found, and it appears today that anence 
pahlic newborns are an excellent source. Further, a number 
of parents of anencephalic newborns desperately desire that 
at least some good for another sick baby might come from 
their own personal tragedy. 
4. Apt laws. National laws provide the moral framework 
upon which a people's social fabric is stretched. To maintain 
this role, laws need modification as presupposed conditions 
x.hange. In the context of severely handicapped newborns, as 
ledical technology is capable of sustaining increasingly mar-
ginal life, we must reevaluate laws designed to safeguard 
human life in light of affected babies. Laws designed to 
further personal well-being are ill-served if used merely to 
protect human life which is now known to be absent any per-
sonal potential. 
The ability of physicians to certify death in a patient has 
evolved since the eighteenth century, and the law has 
changed accordingly. During the 18th century, macabre inci-
dents of "corpses" reviving during funerals and exhumed 
skeletons found to have clawed at coffin lids led to wide-
spread distrust of physicians who were limited to such diag-
nostic techniques as checking for fixed pupils and feeling for 
the pulse. By the mid 19th century the stethoscope had been 
discovered and medical science came to a consensus that 
cessation of circulation and respiration constituted death. This 
criteria was reflected in common law as recorded by Black's 
"Are anencephalic newborns an acceptable 
source for badly needed neonatal transplantable 
hearts and other organs? From the medical 
point of view, the evidence is not all in." 
Law Dictionary up through the 1968 edition. Previously, life-
sustaining technology had so developed that precise criteria 
were needed to know when to replace appropriate care for 
'I-)e living with respectful handling of the dead body. This com-
pelling need led to the landmark Harvard criteria on brain 
death, a series of tests which were so reliable that no indi-
vidual has met the criteria and later regained brain functions. 
However, many patients died without meeting all the Harvard 
criteria, and due to advances in diagnostic skills a more re-
stricted definition of death was recommended by the Presi-
dent's Commission, and hence the widely accepted UDDA. It 
simply states that one of two criteria must be met for death to 
be certified: 1) cessation of circulatory and respiratory func-
tions, and 2) irreversible cessation of all brain functions, in-
cluding those of the brain stem. 
The Death Act actually breaks no new ground beyond the 
Harvard criteria. The Harvard criteria didn't change the cus-
tomary definitions of death based upon spontaneous circula-
tion and respiration. But it did provide superior procedures for 
determining death. 
A good case can be made that society has no need to 
further refine the definition of death. However, the time has 
come for society to consider the appropriateness of updating 
the medical criteria for organ donation. Specifically, the issue 
is whether brain stem death must necessarily be present be-
fore organ donations are allowed. The certified death of the 
neocortex would be sufficient for many persons in regard to 
donation of their own organs, and a ~trong argument could be 
made in defense of this position. 
A fully developed argument for this position is beyond the 
context of this essay, but the argument could develop soci-
ety's growJng recognition of the patient's autonomous control 
,over. his or her own body. Also, an analogy could be made to 
ahe American Medical Association's determination that it is 
ethically permissible for all treatment - including IV nutri-
tion - to be withdrawn from the permanently comatose. If 
families may choose to let loved ones "starve," those same 
comatose individuals should be able to donate the vital or-
gans of their vegetating bodies if they have so chosen in an 
earlier lucid judgment. 
Similarly, if terminally and seriously ill patients have the 
right to forego life-sustaining treatment, they should have the 
right of organ donation according to personal specifications 
which may be realized sooner than brain stem death. Adults 
should be able to decide that once their higher brain functions 
are irreversibly lost, their organs may be transplanted. In the 
case of incompetent adults a duly designated surrogate may 
now decide on the foregoing of life-sustaining treatment, and 
by logical extension a surrogate should be able to implement 
the patient's intentions on organ donation. Severely handicap-
ped neonates whose neocortex is dead or absent would also 
be suitable as organ donors if their deSignated surrogates, 
normally their parents, so decide. 
In this broader line of reasoning, transplantation of anence-
,phalic infants' hearts is but the most obvious instance of a 
situation in which parents might properly consent to organ do-
nation before "whole brain" death occurs. 
Which Ethical Rationale Is Right? 
Determination of which rationale - that in favor of or that 
opposed to direct anencephalic organ procurement - is more 
persuasive depends on exactly what question is being asked. 
Is the question one of individual ethics or of social ethics? If 
the question remains in the arena of individual ethics and 
concerns the confined ethical question of the impaired infant's 
intrinsic worth, the direct utilization of anencephalic organs 
before the determination of "whole brain" death may be com-
mendable. 
Imagine, for example, that a pediatric heart surgeon skilled 
in transplantation were on a small Pacific island with two 
dying babies - an anencephalic and a hypoplastic left-heart 
infant. The latter baby would be dead within hours unless the 
transplantable heart were immediately procured from the 
anencephalic baby. The physician's decision possesses no 
implications beyond the island. Many would agree that the 
transplant operation is not only morally permissible but ob-
ligatory. 
However, transplant surgeons don't live on isolated islands. 
Ethics which focuses on the individual is vital, but an ethics 
which fails to take broad societal sensibilities into account is 
inadequate. Society is increasingly pluralistic, and this plural-
ity must be respected for the good of all. Although this need 
not mean an ethics of the lowest common denominator, it 
does indicate the need to proceed openly and deliberately in 
areas of moral controversy. 
"If anencephalies are seen to have marginal 
human life today which can be sacrificed for the 
good of society, what other forms of human life 
might be utilized tomorrow for th~ supposed 
good of all?" 
Technoiogy wili increasingiy force society to grapple with 
the difference between prolongation of merely genetically 
human individuals and treatment of individuals who possess, 
or who are capable of attaining or regaining, self-awareness. 
If' SOCiety moves toward the latter, the individual merits of di-
rect anencepahlic organ procurement may be , realized. But 
SOCiety today is clearly a composite: some holding to a per- 5 
sonality based definition of human value, others to a biologi-
cal definition, and most of us intuitively drawn toward features 
of both. 
6 
Before statute law on brain death is changed to allow for 
anencephalic exceptions, widespread discussion and debate 
is imperative. Otherwise, several hundred additional newborns 
may be saved for a society racked by a controversy which 
dwarfs the present abortion standoff. A number of neonatal 
lives could be rescued, but the social good would not be well-
served by a rapid liberalizing of present brain death criteria 
for organ procurement. 
1. Jeffrey J. Pomerance and Barry S. Schifrin, "Life Expectancy of the 
Anencephalic Infant and Its Relationship to the 'Baby Doe' Regula-
tions," an unpublished manuscript, pp.4, 5. 
2. See Alexander Morgan Capron, "Anencephalic Donors: Separate 
the Dead from the Dying," Hastings Center Report 17 (February, 
1987), pp.5-9, for insightful, critical analysis of Senator Marks' bill and 
related issues. 
3. Kenneth R. Swaiman and Francis S. Wright, The Practice of 
Pediatric Neurology, Vol. 1 (St. Louis: The C. V. Mosby Co., 1982), 
p.410. 
4. Paul Ramsey, Ethics at the Edges of Life (New Haven: Yale Uni-
versity Press, 1978), p.190. 
5. See Paul Ramsey, Patient as Person (New Haven, Yale Univer-
sity Press, 1970), pp.108-110. 
6. President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems , in 
Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research, Defining Death 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981), pp.36, 
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Would Anencephalic 
Neonates Be Citizens? 
by David Larson 
Professor Walters' helpful essay concludes that the laws of 
our land should not now be changed so as to permit the re-
moval of organs from anencephalic human infants before 
"whole brain" death is verified. The feather that tips the bal-
ance toward ~his judgment is his concern that such legal 
changes mig~t erode "social integration" even more pro-
foundly than Floe vs. Wade has. In the final analysis, his ar-
gument is neither that earlier removal of organs from anence-
pahlic neonates would wrong these or other donors" nor that 
such procedures would degrade the community by making us 
all more calloused toward vulnerable members of our own 
species, but that the resulting civic debates would be intolera-
bly disruptive. 
This conclusion is sobering and perplexing. How discordant 
would these public disagreements actually be? How long 
would they last? How many would they involve? What would 
be their results? No one knows for sure, though pollsters 
"To visitors, what we take for granted must 
seem legally perplexing and -ethically ghastly." 
could be retained to develop some preliminary hints. But what 
would such findings prove? Are there not some moral stands 
persons and professionals should take even if such ethical 
unconventionality does threaten social integration? Of course! 
And Walters agrees. But he does not think this issue merits 
such moral stridency. And I agree with his assessment of our 
proper priorities. 
But since the issue is now before us, let us ask the ultimate 
question: as a matter of ethical prinCiple, would a morally 
wise SOCiety extend to anencephalic human neonates the 
rights and privileges it rightly accords to all citizens irreSpec-( 
tive of race, religion, gender, health, region, wealth, or politi-
cal persuasion? I doubt it. Such infants would not be re-
garded as citizens because they do not possess, never did 
"Would a morally wise society extend to anence-
phalic human neonates the rights and privileges 
it accords to all citizens?" 
possess, and never will possess even the shadow of the ca-
pacity to be selves. This is the ethically decisive consider-
ation. Other factors are also relevant and important, but less 
so. 
A morally wise society would have laws that provide greater 
protection to all human selves, as well as to all prospective 
and retrospective human selves, than they would furnish 
homo sapiens who are unquestionably, irredeemably and per-
manently self-less by every conceivable medical and moral 
measure. 
But our society is not yet that wise. Its laws permit the 
deliberate prenatal termination of thousands of normal and 
healthy prospective persons every year while at the very 
same time these laws require us at great expense to sustain 
thousands of homo sapiens for whom selfhood never was 
and never will be even a remote possibility. To tourists in the 
land of the free and the home of the brave, what we now take 
for granted must seem legally perplexing and ethically ' 
ghastly. 
Cadaveric Donors 
Should Be Dead 
by Gerald Winslow 
James Walters reminds us that our laws do not allow taking 
organs from anencephalic babies who are capable of breath-
ing spontaneously and responding to painful stimuli. By our 
most widely accepted definition of death, such babies are not 
"dead." We are not legally permitted to use them as sources 
of cadaveric organs before they are deceased ~ a truth both 
legal 'and analytic. 
Perhaps the time has come for us to change our definitions 
and our laws . so that they reflect a more mature ethics, one 
willing to harvest the organs of those who will never achieve 
personhood for the sake of those who probably will be per-
sons. Before we change, however, we should wonder. 
In this, Walters helps us by questioning the effect of such 
changes on our society. The potential for social strife, he con-
cludes, is so daunting that society is not ready, just now, for 
the "direct" procurement of anencephalics' organs. ("Direct" 
refers, I take it, to taking organs from anencephalics not yet 
dead by current standards.) 
There is more to wonder about. If we can finesse the prob-
lem of taking organs "directly" from anencephalics by declar-
ing them "dead," even though they may be capable of breath-
ing spontaneously, grasping objects, crying, and responding 
to painful stimuli, would we not be creating a whole new class 
of individuals whose membership could hardly be limited to 
The intent of such questions is not to suggest that procure-
ment of organs from anencepahlics is always wrong. What is 
) 
anencephalics? What are the relevant differences between 
such anencephalics and other individuals (e.g., hydranence-
phalics or those in persistent vegetative state) w!th similarly 
poor prospects for achieving or regaining personal life? Are 
"Are we prepared to defend actions that result 
'in the termination of some human lives, however 
pitiful, for the sake of other human lives, how-
ever promising?" 
" 
\ 
there logically sound ways of avoiding the slippery slope to 
which these questions point? 
If, with less finesse but probably greater honesty, we admit 
that the "direct" procurement of anencephalics' organs means 
taking organs from living infants, are we prepared to defend 
actions that result in the termination of some human lives, 
however pitiful, for the sake O'f other humail lives, however 
promising? What would be the likely results of such actions 
on society's collective conscience, including the willingness to 
donate organs? 
needed, in my view, is the assurance that organs are pro-
cured from the truly dead and not jrorn the dying. CUirent ef-
forts to achieve greater clarity and certainty about the time of 
death appear promising. We should hope that parents of any 
anencephalic will be able, if they choose, to consent to the 
donation of their infant's organs, after the baby has died. 
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Dear Friends: 
Once again, the Center needs your help! 
We are now soliciting $100,000 to finance the current activities and plans of 
LLU's Center for Christian Bioethics. The members of our Board of Directors have 
pledged $35,000 before December 31 for the perpetual endowment. An additional 
$65,000 is needed to fund this year's projects by supplementing the investment in-
come the endowments will yield. 
During fiscal year '86·'87 206 individuals or institutions contributed to the Center 
a total of $116,425.26. The smallest gift was $5. The largest was $30,000. The aver-
age was $565. But every penny helped! 
Under the leadership of Jack Provonsha, our Board of Directors voted a budget 
for the current year on September 25. The expenses anticipated in this budget fall 
into four categories. Forty percent of the total is allocated for wages, benefits and 
honoraria for guest lecturers. Twenty-five percent is earmarked for library acquisi-
tions, a vital first step in the long journey of developing a first-rate collection. 
Twenty percent will be spent printing Update and mailing it without charge to 
10,000 persons, about half of whom are graduates of LLU's schools of medicine 
and dentistry. And fifteen percent will be spent on office supplies and expenses. 
The income needed to cover these expenses will come from interest produced by 
the Center's perpetual endowment plus additional contributions. So your gift, large 
or small, is genuinely needed, as are your prayers and good will! 
Will you help the Center this year? 
'Thank you for considering this request! 
Cordially, 
David R. Larson 
Director 
7 
8 
LPdd ....... e_~-
Volume 3, Number 4 (November 1987) 
EDITORS 
David R. larson 
James W. Walters 
CONSULTANTS 
Katherine Ching 
Richard Utt 
DESIGN AND LAYOUT 
Judy Larson 
TYPESETTING 
Mary Khalaf 
ETHICS CENTER STAFF 
David Larson 
Director 
James W. Walters 
Associate Director 
Charles T eel, Jr. 
Gerald Winslow 
Gwen Utt 
continued from page 7 
DIRECTORS 
Jack Provonsha 
Chairman 
Niels-Erik Andreasen 
Dalton Baldwin 
Bruce Branson 
Brian Bull 
Michael Jackson 
Mlroslav K'.s 
David R. larson 
Milton Murray 
George Reid 
Charles T eel, Jr. 
Carolyn Thompson 
Kenneth Vine 
James W . Walters 
Gerald Winslow 
Norman J . Woods 
Danielle Wuchenich 
George and Nannette Chonkich 
Robert and Merilyn Christenson 
Ramona R. Clark 
Clyde and Pearl Cleveland 
Tracy and Pearl Comstock 
Molleurus and Dorothea Couperus 
Lawrence and Hilda Crandall 
Michael and Marilyn Crane 
John and Anna Mae Crowder 
Joseph S. Cruise 
William and Donna Lee Dassenko 
James and Marilyn Davidian 
Clyde and Janice Davis 
Delbert and Dorothie Dick 
Frank and Doris Domijan 
Russell L. Dounies 
Elwin and Beth Dunn 
Frank and Norma Dupper 
P. William and Yvonne Dysinger 
Michael and Marlena Ehlers 
Harvey and Eleanor Elder 
Daniel Engeberg 
Richard and Cynthia Engel 
Dwight and Donna Evans 
Harold A. Fanselau 
Galen Fillmore 
Elizabeth H. Fisher 
Kenneth and Dorothy Fisher 
Robert D. Fisher 
John Scott Gaspar 
General Conference of SDA 
George and Carol Gibson 
James and Joanne Gibson 
Gary and Sandra Robb Gilbert 
Gary A. Glenesk 
. Timothy S. Greaves 
Beverly June Gregorius 
William and Margaret Hafner 
ETHICS CENTER 
School of Religion 
Loma Linda University 
Loma Linda, California 92350 
Kenneth and Karen Hallock 
Herbert and Marjorie Harder 
Lynn and Peggy Heath 
Helgi and Drusilla Heidar 
T. William and Barbara Hill 
John and Jeanie Hodgkin 
Hospital Corporation of America 
Dennis Howerton 
Gary and Suha Huffaker 
Guy and lona Hunt 
Margaret C. Jackson 
Alf K. Jacobson 
James and Cathie Jetton, Jr. 
Michael and Janine Jones 
Ariel W. Josephson 
George and Denise Kafrouni 
Eldyn L. Karr 
Ray and Luella Kellogg 
Elton and Marga Kerr 
Gerald W. King 
Donald and Phyllis Knepel 
Arthur L. Koehler 
Giles A. Koelsche 
Louis Koenig, Jr. 
Brian and Mary Pat Koos 
J. Mailen and Lynne Kootsey 
C. J. and Grace Larsen 
David and Judy Larson 
Ralph and Jeanne Larson 
Fred and Aura Lee 
Frank and Julie Lemon 
R. Lindsay and Sheryl Lilly 
Loma Linda University Medical Center 
Charles and Rae Lindsay 
Jan and Vanessa Long 
M. C. Theodore and Linda Mackett 
William and Milda Mackintosh 
Robert and Ulrike Marsa 
Robert and Marguerite Marsh 
Kenneth and Irene McGill 
Warren and Brenda McGuire 
Gary and Nikki Mead 
Arnold and Flaudia Michals 
Charles and Naomi Michaelis 
Lillian Miller 
Scott and Mary Miller 
Robert and Gladys Mitchell 
Milton and Virginia Murray 
Else L. Nelson 
George and Elsa Nelson 
Donald and Lynn Nicolay 
Jack and Lois Northcutt 
Harold and Lois Ochs 
June O'Connor 
H. Schubert Palmer 
John E. Peterson 
Jack and Margaret Provonsha 
Charles and Bernadette Randall 
Robert and Judith Rausch 
Douglas and Barbara Re~ok 
Jon and Susanne Reiswig 
E. Robert and Betty Reynolds 
Hugo and Elba Riffel 
E. Arthur and Nilde Robertson 
John and Lucille Roos 
Herb Ruhs 
Lester and Dorothy Rumble, Jr. 
Jan Rushing 
Walter and Ella Rydzewski 
Elmar and Darilee Sakala 
William and Marie Scharffenberg 
Fred and Verona Schnibbe 
Joya Schoen 
Kay R. Schultz 
Dorothy Schumacher 
Neils Michael Scofield 
Benn Scott 
Ronald and Louise Scott 
Eric and Pamela Shadle 
J. Russell Shawver 
Penny Shell 
Arek and Patti Shennar 
Reggie and Margaret Ann Sherrill 
J. Barry and Joan Siebenlist 
James and Joann Slater 
L. A. and C. B. Smart, II 
Daniel and Hilda Goorhuis Smith 
Erland Lloyd Smith 
Warren and Eloise Smith 
David Smoot 
Leonard Soloniuk 
Vicki Soloniuk 
Robert and Linda Spady 
John and Terrie Stafford Spenst 
Lester and Barbara Stannard 
Ernest and May Stanton 
Virginia C. Stevens 
Charles and Sharon Stewart 
Donald L. Stilson 
Kennard and Margaret Stoll 
David and Frances Stout 
O. Ward and Julia Swarner 
James and Gail Szana 
Barry and Desmyrna Taylor 
Robert and Harriett Taylor 
William and Elizabeth Taylor 
John and Nancy Testerman 
Betty Thacker 
James and Lois Thompson 
Ralph Thompson, Sr. 
Ralph and Carolyn Thompson 
Ada Turner 
Harold Utt 
Richard and Gwen Utt 
Fred and Renie Veltman 
Miriam O. Vinnard 
Randi Ruth Wallstrom 
James and Priscilla Walters 
Synove Wasli 
Donald and Sheri Weber 
James and Betty Webster 
Barry and Alberta Wecker 
Dorothy Weisz 
Donald and Jean Welch 
Leslie and Sarah Werner 
Gordon and Elle Wheeler 
James M. Whitlock . 
David and Constance Wilbur 
Rodney and Barbara Willard 
R. Daryll and Gloria Williams 
George Wilson 
Kenneth and Joyce Wilson 
Kee P. and Joanne Wong 
Lester and Dolores Wright 
Danielle Wuchenich 
Tom and Vi Zapara 
Lottie Ziprick 
Bulk Rate 
U.S. Postage 
PAID 
( 
Permit No. 6 l 
Lama Linda, CA 
